Alıhough its subjcct mattcr covcrs dccisions and pratiqucs whose dircct or indirect influcncc on thc livcs of statcs, countries and thcreforc, individuals cannot bc neglectcd, thc study of intcrnational Relations (IR) has yet failcd to achicvc a status of proper scicncc. This essay inquires the relative position of thc disciplinc versus general social thcory, its comparative povcrty in thc cpistcmological 1 and mcthodological altcrnative approachcs and poses the question vvhether this povcrty is an outeome of the thcorctical povcrty; or more concisely, thc domination of the disciplinc by onc single paradigm for half a ccntury: Rcalism. So far, thc study contends, thc political and social milicu in vvhich intcrnational Relations has developed as an acadcmic pursuit, vvas not sufficiently ripe for a compctition of theoretical pcrspcclivcs. Thc occurrcnccs of the last tvvo dccadcs in thc ficld have refleeted on the pcrception and conccptuali/.ation of statcs' relations vvilh cach other and on a plethora of thcorctical approachcs the basic tenet of vvhich is an opposilion to ıhc posilivist orienied realist thcory of IR.
Closure in International Relations Theory:
Parlicularly for praelilioners of politics, IR vvas conccived as the act of forming pragmatical and practical responses to adapt to the rcalitics and facts of vvorld politics. It can safcly bc argucd that vvithin such a narrovviscd framevvork there exists not much nccd for any ihcorclical approach. Hovvevcr, 1 Epistemology, as a general definilion, is used here after Gill and Law (1988: 19) as thc thcorctical nature of and conditions for the acquisition and grovvth of knovvledge. Different epistemologies are associated vvith different philosophies of scicnce such as empiricism, rationalism ete. Each gives rise to a different eriteria of appraisal.
that is ııot acceptcd to bc thc casc. It is stili thcorics through vvhich facts arc attributcd thcir mcanings and rcndcr thcm available to analysis. As Gabricl Almond (1965) pointcd out in relation to diplomatic, military, propaganda and forcign aid programs in U.S. forcign policy, a sound theory of social and cultural change as a basis of determining such policics is nccessary (Shafcr, 1988; 12-13) . Almond has thus cstablishcd that a scientific study (or praclical policy) is groundless vvilhout conccptual frames of refercnce.
Realist policy (ineluding its more up to date version, Nco-realism) vvhich has monopolizcd IR theory sincc World War II has assumcd that intcrnational relations play no part or cxert no influcnce vvhatsoevcr in thc everyday lives of socicties or individuals; as events that can bc studicd by reducing to thc bchavior of political dccision making and exccutive mcchanisms (Waltz, 1979; 62-64) .
This formulation has limited the ficld of scientific attention in IR to focal empirical incidcnts end "bchavior of states" as sole actors of interstate relationships. An cvaluation and accounting of events in currcnt political conjonctures vvas considcrcd sulTicient to satisfy valid scientific rcquircmcnts of the Realist paradigm (scc Littlc, 1980, 9) . The nccd to refer to multiple thcoretical framcvvorks vvas hardly felt; thc cpislcmological void vvas filled by realism in rcfcrcncc to vvhich events and facts could bc attributcd vvith mcaning and could bc cxplaincd by generalised scientific lavvs. Realism, a theory that almost spontancously emerged to fiil this void, can bc vievved as a demonstration that any field of acadcmic interest, has to bc guidcd intcllcctually by theory in order to bc considcrcd a scientific discipline. The reason IR has yet failcd to evolve into a social science per se is perhaps a consequence of thc thcoretical povcrty that thc realist domination has causcd in thc ficld.
International Relations on the Grounds of Social Theory:
Social Theory, thc blankct name for ali aspects of scientific inquiry into human activitics and institutions thal ineludes intcrnational relations as vvcll, has alvvays bccn rich in regard to thc simultancous compclition of a variety of conccptual approachcs that not only conccive the samc events and facts in different framevvorks but also explain them vvith differing lavvs. Thc compcting social paradigms cach othcr to establish thcir methods of scientific procedures of confirmation or falsification; vvhich has constituted thc dynamics of the epistemo-historical proccdure of rivalling thcorics in thc Kuhnian 2 sense. The history of scientific revolutions emerges as the rcplacemcnt of one dominant paradigm by anothcr (Kuhn, 1962: 52-53, 77, 82, 89-93, 145-146, 157 ).
The only paradigmatic rivalry in thc field of IR to speak of, is the replaccment of thc pre-WorId War II idealist approach by realism, an approach much bcgging to bc callcd a propcr thcory vvith its normative and prcscriptivc attitude (Smiıh, 1987: 192; Bull, 1972) . This dcsignatcs realism, as thc sole theory ever in IR; vvhosc genesis (or more prccisely, acadcmic victory) coincides vvith thc energence of a vvorld political order as thc U.S. its aetive and ccntral povvcr and vvhich sccks ansvvcrs to qucstions that arc in majority, U.S. oriented. In fact, the focus of modern criticism against realism has maintained that it has nourishcd an organic relalion to thc political praes of the U.S. and has carricd over its social and political ideology to IR. Hovvcver, thc role of scientific claims by realism as an ideology and valuc free thcory should not bc overpassed in its near universal acadcmic popularity either fnot vvithstanding the rccent crilics' 3 conlcntion that realism is a rcflcction of American policy and ideology in IRj. That its validity as a paradigm has come to bc questioncd is no coincidence; thc emergent vvorld political atmosphere has opened up nevv spheres of conccption in intcrnational relations vvhich cannot bc gauged any longer vvith thc conventional methods of analysis so securcly established in the old pattern of relations that belong to a former pattern. As Hegcl said, thought never generates in vacuo.
The Epistemological Heritage of Social Theory:
Thc development of thcory in social scicnce in the 17-18th centuries is a resullant of efforts to clcar thc field of thc infiucnccs of, first theology and then, philosophy historically accouplcd to thc gcncalogy of industriali/.cd and differentialed urban socictics. Sociology, psychology and cconomy have not only ereated thcir individual, independent fields but also have adoplcd mcthodologics -mainly after those of natural scicnces-ihat established them as propcr scicnces (Tolan, 1993: 137-141) . Thc advantage of general social thcory vvas its inheritance from philosophy some kind of ansvver(s) to thc quintcssential queslion "vvhat is knovvlcdge and hovv is it acquircd?"; and ıhe epistcmo-mcthodological infrastrueture generaled by thc responses (Bostanoğlu, 1995; Tolan, 1993: 137-141) .
Political scicnce (of vvhich IR is gencrally considered a part), perhaps thc youngest member on ıhc gcncalogical trce of social scicnces constitutcs a good examplc of this: The debate vvhelher the disciplinc should more number of follovvers vvho adhcre to its practices of "normal scicnce", i.e., its praxes of lavvs, thcory, application and instruments (Kuhn, 1962: 89-93; 145-146) . o J Richard Ashlcy, James DcrDerian, Michacl Shapiro, Robcrt Cox, Andrcvv Linklater, R. B. J. VValkcr to name a few "critics".
appropriately be callcd "political sociology" continucs (Sarıbay, 1994: 23-28) . A prcdominantly American acadcmic endcavour, it has bccomc a widcly adhered ficld in Europc as vvcll borrovving largcly from thc cpistcmology and methodology of other social scicnccs. its American tilt has colorcd political scicnce vvith a noticcable positivist -cmpiricist tint as thc favorcd position of the U.S. acadcmc; hovvcver, on both side of thc Atlantic a strong albcil diffuse voicc of nonpositivist disscnt fulfilling Kuhn's mcasurcs of a paradigm has also commandcd a considcrablc audicnce (Birnbaum, 1988: 6-11) . In thcir diflusion, thc disscnlivc paradigms have cocxistcd despite thcir incommcnsurability (Ncufcld, 1993: 69) . Roscnau (1982) stresses thc role of personal and circumstantial factors that lcad scicntists to thc choice of a paradigm vvhcrcas Imrc Lakatos points out to thc cocxistcncc of compcting Scicntific Rcscarch Programs vvhich interpret and cxplain facts diffcrcntly (Ncufcld, 1993: 70; Nicholson, 1992: 37; Lakatos and Musgravc, 1974) . Evcn vvithin thc samc program (paradigm) a conscnsus or convcrgcncc is not nccessary: Thc psychological thcorics of frutration and aggression coincd by thc Yalc Group and Bcrkovvitz, thc Social Lcarning Thcory of Albcrt Bandura; thc Social Influcncc thcory of James Tcdcschi arc incommcnsurablc and incompatiblc cxccpt for thc strict adhcrcnce to thc canons of positivist social thcory (isen, 1995: 73-87 ).
Evcn vvithin thc positivist "rcscarch program" IR has rcmained poor in regard to compcting thcorics. Sincc Comtc, positivism has rulcd Westcrn social scicncc. In thc ficld of IR, thc manifest positivist approach has been rcalism in thc last half ccntury. Thc rcccnt opposition lo rcalism since the 1980's oflen stem from a rcjeclion of thc positivist mcnialily vvhich applics thc methods of nalural scicnces lo social phenomena. This disscnt, vvhich can be traccd back to thc "Critical Thcory" of thc Frankfurt School or ihe post Wittgenstein and post Winch approachcs vvhich emphasize ıhc specificity of cullural diffcrcnccs via linguisıic thcorics and post modernist rcjcclionism also dravv largcly on thc liberating epistcmological irajectorics of Kuhn (Jones, 1995, 13) .
Nonrcalist IR thcorics do not galher adhercnis coincidcnlally or mercly bccausc thcir discoursc is suddcnly undcrstood better. As Robcrt Cox (1992: 444) vvrote, ihcory is alvvays for somconc and serves somc purpose. Pcrspcctivcs 4 vvhich arc rcflcctcd in thc thcorics thcy generate, crystallize dcpcndcntly on political time and spacc. Each perspeetive emerges in a given hislorical and institutional contcxt. Thc rangc of variation from pcrspcctivcs of theories they engender is dependent on the acadcmic community and wider political forccs, according to Cox (1986: 207) vvho Ihus points out to a further dclincation of thc limits Kuhn has dravvn for paradigms in rcfcrcncc to scientific communitics as regards thc scicnces vvith a dircct socio-political contcnt. From this vicvvpoint, a eloser look at the "perspeetive" rcalism as a positivist thcory reflccts vvill serve to elarify thc relationship bctvvcen social rcality and social scicnce. Especially vvhere studics of social phenomena arc conccrncd, thc socio-political funetions of scicnce play a largc role in determining the dominant paradigm. The sccular, ccntralized, industrializcd capitalist socictics of thc immediate post-Enlightcnmcnt Europc have, on the onc hand opposcd and guardcd social scicnces against thc penetration of philosophy vvhich vvas a possible threat of rcinviting theology to this liberated domain; on the other thc socialist movcmcnts of thc 19th century has causcd a cocxistcncc, maybe even a codcvclopmcnt of conscrvativc and radical theories. These incompatiblc approachcs have rendered social scicncc "an idcological as vvcll as scicntific" cndcavour as "ıhc scicncc of thc nevv industrial sociely" (Bottomorc, 1977; 9) . The roots of contcmporary paradigmatic debates can casily bc traccd to this period vvhen thc argument bctvvccn thc positivists vvho propagated thc application of natural scicntific method to socicty and those vvho put thc emphasis on social ehange; vievving social phenomena as specific, goal dircctcd, mcaningful dynamics roolcd in thc proccss of history. Thc latter vvho naturally insisted on specific melhods spccially devised to study socio-historic phenomena have referred to thcmsclvcs as dialccticians, rcflcctivc thcorists, rcconstructionists, dcconstructionists, post-structuralists or postmodernist (Bottomorc, 1997; Der Dcrian and Shapiro, 1989; Onuf, 1989 ).
Scicncc docs not occur in vac.uo. Rcgardless of its immediate, dircct practical conscqucnccs, in a sense, it funetions as a cognitivc systcm of sociely in determining and conceptualizing qucstions conccrning cxpcrienccs livcd, as vvcll as a systcmization of probable and possible ansvvcrs. Thercforc allhough thc qucstions and problems may bc delined by the particular time and spacc of such cxpcricnccs, the subjcct of scicnce is ıhc pası, present and fulure relations (real and potenlial) ihat form socicty. Thc transformations of post-scholastic Europc have resultcd in qucslions and problems unansvvcrcd by thc prcviously valid thcological -mctaphysical paradigms and thc study of both nature and socicty as subjccts independent from cclestial dccrccs.
Positivism vvhich bases its conccption of trulh on an instrumental rationalily thal sceks a corrcspondcncc bctvvccn thcorctical assumptions and empirically tcslable rcality has a fundamcnlal claim of bcing valuc frec and objeetive, therefore scicntific. The social scicncc version of this claim rcads "ideology free". This empirically gathcrcd and tested knovvlcdgc of thc facts of the vvorld rcllccls outsidc rcality "here and novv" (Sargut, 1994: 27-28) . Thus a clcarcut distinetion bctvvccn a dichotomizcd subjcct and object, thc observcr and the obscrvcd, subjectivity and objcctivity, ageney and structurc, universalism and particularism ete., bccomes the operalional method of achieving the positivislic knovvlcdgc of rcality (Ncufcld, 1993: 55-56) .
The "here and novv" approach of positivism tovvard socicty and its phenomena fixes events at their final point of invcstigation in time and space. A continuing flovv of time and the changcs it incurs arc rcduccd to generalizations or univcrsal lavvs that defy time and place, assuming and asserting that, given thc samc conditions, thc same causes vvill producc thc same results here and novv, in the past or in future. This reversibility, inspircd by Ncvvtonian physics freczcs time as a dimension, thc positivist analysis becomcs atcmporal and ahistoric (Prigoginc and Stcngcrs, 1984: 68; Wallerstein, 1995 Wallerstein, : 252-254, isen, 1995a .
In both natural and social scicnces, time is an absolute, controllable and measurable componcnt of positivist analysis in the Galilcan and Cartesian sense (Glcick -?-; 56-57). Yet, sincc Einstcin first posed thc thcory of relativity, time has stopped bcing conccivcd of an absolute catcgory in physics, but as relative to spacc and motion. Hciscnbcrg's "Uncertainty Principle" and Quantuuı Mcchanics of subatomic particles have shovvn that at least under ccrtain conditions, even matter ceases to bc a "real rcality". More recently, Bcnard's Instability has established in hydrodynamics that molcculcs far from a state of cquiiibrium "scck and find" cquilibrium again in unpredictiblc vvays. Chaos Thcory in mathcmatics studying complcx systems has concludcd that despite an undcrlying order, ccrtain phenomena simply defy predietion. Such discovcrics have undermined a very basic tenet of positivist scicnce by shovving the futility of trying to reach univcrsal determinisms even in "posilive" scicnces. The common aspcct of ali these contcmporary theorics is that they considcr time not as a controllable constant but as a tcmporal variable of thc phenomena under invcstigation (Prigoginc, 1993: 19-22; isen, 1995: 5) . Thc inelusion of temporality as a dimension of scicntific inquiry has laid open to qucstioning thc positivist reliancc on and reliability of objcctivity and dctcrministic predietions (Prigogine, 1993: 22) . The nevv emphasis on the "time arrovv"; temporality as a neccssily of thc natural scienccs has placcd thc positivist paradigms of physics in an untenable position (Scc Prigogine; ). Yet as lale as mid 1980's, positivism's appeal has continucd in the social scicnces (Sce Nicholson; . In IR, an cxamplar ncorcalist Robert Kcohanc (1986: 1-3), vvhilc defending thc uscfulncss of thcory in thc disciplinc, complaincd that theorics of vvorld politics are riddled vvith the seholars' value systems, pcrsonal expcricnces and temperaments, vvhereas scicntific tlıcorics such as Ncvvtonian physics providc povvcrful, value free cxplanations.
The atcmporal approach of positivist social theory, accepting thc here and novv empirical rcality of phenomena as a univcrsal and reversible given, implicitly lades them vviıh an unchangeability bcaring inevitable idcological implications. Thus, socicty, including its values and norms is assumed as a constant given vvilh ali its struetures and proccsses; a phenomenon thal has achicved a level of maturity and perfection that has no need any longer for fundamental ehanges vvithin the time arrovv (isen, 1995a: 5) . A good example of this attitude is the positivist theory of modernisation, devised to explain the differenee among members of the intcrnational community on a certain "scale of development". Modernist discourse in effect, is a mcta-language ideology vvhich telis pcople hovv they should live imposing the model of the Wcstern "modern" socicty as a "telos", an objcctivc to bc achicved if any socicty intends to be anything of value. The term modern, furthermore, serves a linguo-idcological funetion as an cxprcssion of not "bcing modern" but thc "consciousncss of bcing modern"; by thus separating vvhat is modern from vvhat is not (Alexandcr, 1995: 69-70) .
The Critics of the Positivist "ideology":
Thc positivist claiııı to objcctivity is founded on a teehnieal rationality that dravvs on quanlilalivc and statistical tcchniques cxtcnsively in order to mcasurc not vvhat ought to bc, but vvhat is. This teehnieal rationality is in turn the basis of positivism's claim to "thc end of ideology in (social) science" by analyzing phenomena cmpirically hcncc objcctively; lcaving out values, norms or pcrsonal prcfcrcnccs of thc scicntist. It is this apparent objcctive and non-idcological virtuc of cmpirical positivism that undcrlics its acadcmic appcal (Ashlcy, 1984: 250; Linklatcr, 1990: 9) . This appcal has naturally found a voicc in IR as vvell. Ali information in thc ficld since thc Sccond World War has bccn ccntred on onc variant of a "speetator theory of knovvlcdgc" or another; as Jim Gcorgc (1993: 204) has put: "The knovvlcdgc of the real vvorld is glcancd via a realm of extcrnal facts vvhich impose themselves on thc seholar/statesman vvho is then constraincd by the policy/analytical art of the possible".
Thc cpistemological roots of realism in IR as a positivist scicnce streteh as far back as post-Enlightenment, post-Cartesican rationalism of Western Europcan philosophy and thc socio-political discoursc of thc epoch. Thc rationaliSt assumption of a corrcspondcncc bctvvcen theory and cmpirical fact is of dubious standing sincc Humc; hovvevcr this dichotomy has undcrlicd positivist theory in ali aspccts, ineluding realist IR theory (Gcorgc, 1993: 202) . In thc laltcr half of thc 20th ccntury, it has emerged as thc sole theory of IR simultancously vvilh thc rise of ıhc U.S.A. to thc ccnter of the complex vvcb of vvorld relations as a lcadcr and thc most aetive member of the intcrnational community. Thc political vvorld role of the U.S. vvas formulated in its rathcr idcological designalion as "thc lcadcr of the free vvorld" and thc need for a scientific analysis of this ncvv position vvas ansvvcrcd through ıhe adoption of realism in scholarly circlcs. In this aspcct, realism is and has alvvays bccn an Amcrican scicncc born and developed in response to American prioriıies. During ıhe Cold War, the pover polilics have rendered realism the paradigm in IR; reflccting in Rothstcin's (1972: 350) phraseology as "Ihc catcchism of intcllcctual and policy making circlcs". Rcalism as a doctrinc centcred on traditional balance of powcr dictatcs formulations of collcclivc security, with a state centric, anarchical thcory of povver politics, dcaling primarily with maintaining thc stalus quo (Hoffman: 1992: 37-42) . Thc neorcalists (Waltz, Gilpin, Krasncr, Kcohanc) who followed first generation seholars such as Morgcnthau, Carr, Kissingcr or Wight maintaincd the state centric, power oricntcd, anarchically structurcd aspects of political theory of a world which ran on balance of povver and in the name of scientism, dressed up thc thcory vvith thc "then-in" systems approach, empirical reduetionism and oliıcr acccptablc paraphernalia of posilivistic empirical tcchnicality thal enabled thc study of thc "vvorld out there" (Gcorgc; 1993: 212) .
On an overall vievv, thc realist tradition studied the "vvorld out there" as an imagc frozen in time, lcaving thc meta proccsscs such as history, vvhich figurcd largcly in thc cmcrgcncc of this imagc out of thc cquation and negleeting that aspect of rcality vvhich can bc subjcct to change as a rcsult of thc interaction bctvvcen thcory and practicc. In other vvords, an approach qucstioning hovv and vvhy thcorctical framevvorks ever comc into bcing vvas never incorporatcd into thc positivist-rcalist tradition of scicncc. On thc other side of thc fence, thc anti-positivist Critical Thcory of IR, cvolving from the idcas of thc Frankfurt School has and docs slrivc to establish and emphasize thc conncction bctvvccn social phenomena, thc lives of individuals, historical proccsscs and thcorics. Thus, thc cveryday practicc of povvcr is rcconnectcd vvith thcorctical knovvlcdgc and thc debate foreelosed by rcalism on hovv wc comc to knovv and crcatc rcality. Critical Thcory docs not posit an atcmporal, ahistorical, continuing present but is oricntcd tovvard a continuing process of historical ehange (Gcorge, 1993: 218) .
VVithin the "Thinking Space"; International Theory as Science:
In the 1990's, thc nevv, post-positivist approaches in intcrnational thcory, vvhether they comc under thc name critical, rcHcxive, poststructuralist or post modern, have crcatcd a "thinking spacc" [to usc thc lcxicon of Jim Gcorge (1989) ] and have rclicvcd it from the monopolistic hold of thc realist paradigm representing only a fragment of social thcory as a vvholc. Novv, IR thcory faccs thc tcmpo-cxpansivc (spread in time) vistas of altcrnative paradigms; different pcrspcctivcs of rcality vvhich link social relationships and proccsscs vviıh every dimension of human life and expcrience. As a scicntific disciplinc, IR novv progressively integrates both vvith thc history, present and futurc of social strueture and vvith cvolving intcllcctual systems through an inquiry into not only its assumptions of scicncc, but thc mcnlal constructs lying at thc bases of those assumptions as vvcll; hencc, it advanccs on thc palh of conccptual varicgation other social or even natural scicnces have Iong achicvcd. In the light of pluralism in theorclical approachcs, truth is sprcad bcforc Ihc scienlist, not mcrcly via empirical observation and expcrimcnt, but also wilh iLs tcmporal dimcnsions involving transformation and unccrtainty; vvhosc analysis rcjccts rcstriction to a monopoly of aesthctic pcrccptions, control and prcdiclion only. With thc advent of plural cpistcmologics in intcrnational theory, thc formations among statcs so far studied from a singlc vicwpoint and thc form of knovvlcdge considcrcd thc privilcgc of a limited spherc of scholars adhcring to that vista, opcncd up to analysis as an element of social, even pcrsonal expcricnce. Thc positivist criicria of scicntific knovvlcdge are no longer accedcd to be adcquatc in understanding thc machinations of our vvorld, bolh in thc natural and social spheres. Contcmporary findings of physics have shcd a light on thcorctical and epistcmological debates; and an cxpanding agrecment is obscrvcd in thc social scicnccs on a rcquircmcnt for creating nevv conceptual frames of rcfcrcnce.
During thc ycars of hcatcd debates on mcthodological issucs in social scicnce, IR thcory, safc in thc haven rcalism providcd, spent its time attending limited issucs vvith limited instruments; unpcrturbcd by thc tumulLs of cpistcmological diffcrcncc and conflict. Novv, if it is to deserve a scicntific status, IR thcory has lo bccomc bolh ıhc ficld of inquiry and thc subjcct of analysis of ali thc paradigms applicd lo ıhc study of social life, of vvhich it is an intcgral part. Pcrhaps thc 1990's signify a turning point in ıhc history of IR: By claiming its snarc of thc cpistcmological heritage and vvcalth of other scicnccs, thc shccr "disciplinc" faccs ıhc chancc to maturc into a "Sociology of intcrnational Relations". For half a ccntury, thc disciplinc has enjoyed a mcthodological and philosophical homogcncily and lack of dissent uncqualcd in any scicntific endcavor sincc scholasticism. At this justion, intcrnalional thcory, just as ali thc rest of thc speetrum of social scicnccs, is in ıhc proccss of getling more dccply involvcd in a elash of paradigms vvhich ali scicnccs must accept as a norm of maturily. Considcring that a grovving sharc of thc disciplinc's literatüre in thc last tvvo dccadcs aims to bridgc thc hiatus bctvvccn thc philosophy and sociology of scicncc and IR, it is not very long bcforc intcrnational thcory attains that maturity -in fact, if it alrcady has not.
